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Abstract—In this paper, a framework for recognizing network
traffic in order to detect anomalies is proposed. We propose
to combine and correlate parameters from different layers in
order to detect 0-day attacks and reduce false positives. More-
over, we propose to combine statistical and signal-based fea-
tures. The major contribution of this paper are: novel frame-
work for network security based on the correlation approach
as well as new signal based algorithm for intrusion detection
using matching pursuit.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are based on mathe-
matical models, algorithms and architectural solutions pro-
posed for correctly detecting inappropriate, incorrect or
anomalous activity within a networked systems. Intrusion
detection systems can be classiﬁed as belonging to two
main groups depending on the detection technique em-
ployed: anomaly detection and signature-based detection.
Anomaly detection techniques, that we focus on in our
work, rely on the existence of a reliable characterization
of what is normal and what is not, in a particular network-
ing scenario. More precisely, anomaly detection techniques
base their evaluations on a model of what is normal, and
classify as anomalous all the events that fall outside such
a model. If an anomalous behavior is recognized, this does
not necessarily imply that an attack activity has occurred:
only few anomalies can be actually classiﬁed as attempts
to compromise the security of the system.
Anomaly detection systems can be classiﬁed according to:
– the used algorithm,
– analyzed features of each packet singularly or of the
whole connection,
– the kind of analyzed data - whether they focus on the
packet headers or on the payload.
Most current IDS systems have problems in recognizing
new attacks (0-day exploits) since they are based on the
signature-based approach. In such mode, when system does
not have an attack signature in database, such attack is not
recognized. Another drawback of current IDS systems is
that the used parameters and features do not contain all
the necessary information about traﬃc and events in the
network.
Therefore, in this paper we present the framework in which
anomaly detection system based on correlation and diver-
sity approaches are used, such as:
• Item diversity – diﬀerent network layers parameters
are monitored and used. In such approach we do not
have information from transport layer only – such in-
formation is merged/correlated with application layer
events.
• Correlation – correlation is used twofold (during de-
cision):
– item both anomaly and signature-based ap-
proaches are correlated,
– parameters/features from various network layers
are correlated,
– statistical and signal-based features are used and
correlated.
2. Technical Solution
In this paper, a new solution for aanomaly detection sys-
tem (ADS) based on signal processing algorithm is pre-
sented. ADS analyzes traﬃc from Internet connection in
certain point of a computer network. The proposed ADS
system uses redundant signal decomposition method based
on matching pursuit algorithm. ADS based on matching
pursuit uses dictionary of base functions (BFD) to de-
compose input 1D traﬃc signal (1D signal may repre-
sent packets per second) into set of based functions called
also atoms. The proposed BFD has a ability to approxi-
mate traﬃc signal. Number and parameters of base func-
tions was limited in order to shorten atom search time
process.
Since some attacks are visible only in speciﬁc layer
(e.g., SQLIA), in our approach, we propose to use network
parameters from diﬀerent layers.
Transport layer, network layer and application layer param-
eters are used.
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In the further step, we use the presented parameters to
calculate characteristics (features) of the observed traﬃc.
Some of the parameters are used for statistical features
calculation and/or for signal-based feature calculation re-
spectively. Feature extraction methods are presented in the
following subsections.
2.1. Statistical Features
The chi-square multivariate test for anomaly detection sys-
tems can be represented by:
X2 =
p
∑
i=1
(Xi −X i)2
X i
, (1)
where X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xp) denote an observation of p vari-
ables from a process at time t and X = (X1,X2, . . . ,X p) is
the sample mean vector.
Using only the mean vector in Eq. (1), cause that chi-square
multivariate test detects only the mean shift on one or more
of the variables.
2.2. Signal Processing Features
Signal processing techniques have found application in net-
work intrusion detection systems because of their abil-
ity to detect novel intrusions and attacks, which can-
not be achieved by signature-based approaches [1]. It
has been shown that network traﬃc presents several rel-
evant statistical properties when analyzed at diﬀerent levels
(e.g., self-similarity, long range dependence, entropy vari-
ations, etc.) [2].
Approaches based on signal processing and on statistical
analysis can be powerful in decomposing the signals re-
lated to network traﬃc, giving the ability to distinguish be-
tween trends, noise, and actual anomalous events. Wavelet-
based approaches, maximum entropy estimation, princi-
pal component analysis techniques, and spectral analysis,
are examples in this regard which have been investigated
in the recent years by the research community [3], [4],
[5], [6], [7]. However, discrete wavelet transform provides
a large amount of coeﬃcients which not necessarily reﬂect
required features of the network signals.
Therefore, in this paper we propose another signal pro-
cessing and decomposition method for anomaly/intrusion
detection in networked systems. We developed original
anomaly detection type IDS algorithm based on matching
pursuit.
In the rest of the paper, our original ADS method will
be presented in details. Moreover, results of experimental
setup will be given. We tested our method with standard
traces in worm detection scenario as well as in anomaly
detection scenario. Discussion on redundant dictionary pa-
rameters and ﬁnal conclusions will be provided.
Matching pursuit
Matching pursuit signal decomposition was proposed by
Mallat and Zhang [8].
Matching pursuit is a greedy algorithm that decomposes
any signal into a linear expansion of waveforms which
are taken from an over complete dictionary D. The dictio-
nary D is an over complete set of base functions called
also atoms.
D = {αγ : γ ∈ Γ} , (2)
where every atom αγ from dictionary has norm equal to 1,
‖αγ‖= 1, Γ represents set of indexes for atom transforma-
tion parameters such as translation, rotation and scaling.
Signal s has various representations for dictionary D. Sig-
nal can be approximated by set of atoms αk from dictionary
and projection coeﬃcients ck
s =
|D|−1
∑
n=0
ckαk . (3)
To achieve best sparse decomposition of signal s (min) we
have to ﬁnd vector ck with minimal norm but suﬃcient for
proper signal reconstruction. Matching pursuit is a greedy
algorithm that iteratively approximates signal to achieve
good sparse signal decomposition. Matching pursuit ﬁnds
set of atoms αγk such that projection of coeﬃcients is max-
imal. At ﬁrst step, residual R is equal to the entire signal
R0 = s.
R0 = 〈αγ0 , R0〉αγ0 + R1 . (4)
If we want to minimize energy of residual R1 we have to
maximize the projection. |〈αγ0 , R0〉|. At next step we must
apply the same procedure to R1
R1 = 〈αγ1 , R1〉αγ1 + R2 . (5)
Residual of signal at step n can be written
Rns = Rn−1s−〈Rn−1s
∣∣αγk 〉αγk . (6)
Signal s is decomposed by set of atoms
s =
N−1
∑
k=0
〈αγk |Rns〉αγk + Rns . (7)
Algorithm stops when residual Rns of signal is lower then
acceptable limit.
Our approach to intrusion detection algorithm
In basic matching pursuit algorithm atoms are selected in
every step from entire dictionary which has ﬂat structure.
In this case algorithm causes signiﬁcant processor burden.
In our coder dictionary with internal structure was used.
Dictionary is built from:
– atoms,
– centered atoms.
Centered atoms groups such atoms from D that are as more
correlated as possible to each other. To calculate mea-
sure of correlation between atoms function o(a, b) can be
used [9]
o(a,b) =
√
1−
( |〈a,b〉|
‖a‖2‖b‖2
)2
. (8)
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The quality of centered atom can be estimated according
to
Ok,l =
1
|LPk,l| ∑i∈LPk,lo
(
Ac(i), Wc(k,l)
)
, (9)
where: LPk,l is a list of atoms grouped by centered atom,
Ok,l is mean of local distances from centered atom Wc(k,l)
to the atoms Ac(i) which are strongly correlated with Ac(i).
Centroid Wc(k,l) represents atoms Ac(i) which belongs to the
set i∈ LPk,l . List of atoms Lk,l should be selected according
to the equation:
max
i∈LPk,l
o
(
Ac(i),Wc(k,l)
)≤ min
t∈D\LPk,l
o
(
Ac(t),Wc(k,l)
)
. (10)
In the proposed IDS solution 1D real Gabor base function
(equation was used to build dictionary) [9], [10], [11]
αu,s,ξ ,φ (t) = cu,s,ξ ,φ α
( t−u
s
)
cos
(
2piξ (t−u)+ φ), (11)
where:
α(t) =
1√
s
e−pit
2
, (12)
cu,s,ξ ,φ – is a normalizing constant used to achieve atom
unit energy.
In order to create over complete set of 1D base functions
dictionary D was built by varying subsequent atom param-
eters: frequency ξ and phase φ , position u, scale s.
Fig. 1. Example atom from dictionary.
Base functions dictionary D was created with using
10 diﬀerent scales (dyadic scales) and 50 diﬀerent frequen-
cies. In Fig. 1 example atoms from dictionary D are pre-
sented.
3. Experimental Results
Percentage of the recognized anomalies as a function of en-
coded atoms from dictionary of base functions is presented
in Fig. 2. Five dictionaries with diﬀerent parameters (dif-
ferent number of scales and frequencies) were used in our
ADS system.
Percentage of the recognized anomalies for dictionary of
base functions with approximately constant number of
atoms is presented in Fig. 3. In this case we try to
Fig. 2. Percentage of the recognized anomalies as a function of
encoded atoms.
leave approximately constant number of atoms in dictio-
nary but with diﬀerent proportions of scales and frequen-
cies.
Fig. 3. Percentage of the recognized anomalies for Dictionary of
Base Functions with approximately constant number of atoms.
In Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 there are example results taken from
our ADS system. Traﬃc traces were analyzed by pro-
posed ADS with the use of 20 minutes windows (most
attacks (more than 80%) last no longer then 20 minutes).
In every window we calculate matching pursuit mean pro-
jection parameter in order to recognize suspicious traﬃc
behavior. Analyzed traces are infected by worms (Tables 1
and 2), DDos (Table 4) and DDoS SYNFlood (Table 3)
attacks.
4. Conclusions
In this paper a framework for recognizing attacks and
anomalies in the computer networks is presented. Our
methodology is based on both statistical and signal based
features. The major contribution and innovation is the ap-
plication of matching pursuit algorithm to calculate network
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Table 1
Matching pursuit mean projection for TCP trace [12]. Traces are analyzed
with the use of 20 minutes windows
TCP trace
Window1 Window2 Window3
Mean
Mean
MP-MP MP-MP MP-MP
MP-MP
MP-MP
for trace
for normal
trace
Mawi 2004.03.06 tcp 210,34 172,58 239,41 245,01 240,00
Mawi 2004.03.13 tcp 280,01 214,01 215,46 236,33 240,00
Mawi 20.03.2004 (attacked: worm Witty) 322,56 365,24 351,66 346,48 240,00
Mawi 25.03.2004 (attacked: worm Slammer) 329,17 485,34 385,50 400,00 240,00
Table 2
Matching pursuit mean projection for UDP trace [12]. Traces are analyzed
with the use of 20 minutes windows
UDP trace
Window1 Window2 Window3
Mean
Mean
MP-MP MP-MP MP-MP
MP-MP
MP-MP
for trace
for normal
trace
Mawi 2004.03.06 tcp 16,06 13,80 17,11 15,65 16,94
Mawi 2004.03.13 tcp 20,28 17,04 17,40 18,24 16,94
Mawi 20.03.2004 (attacked: worm Witty) 38,12 75,43 61,78 58,44 16,94
Mawi 25.03.2004 (attacked: worm Slammer) 56,13 51,75 38,93 48,93 16,94
Table 3
Matching pursuit mean projection for TCP trace [13] (traces consist of DDoS SynFlood attacks).
Traces are analyzed with the use of 20 minutes windows
TCP trace
Window1 Window2 Window3
Mean
Mean
MP-MP MP-MP MP-MP
MP-MP
MP-MP
for trace
for normal
trace
One hour trace from unina1 1211 3271 3007 2496,333 860,00
One hour trace from unina2 1906 1804 1251 1653,667 860,00
Table 4
Matching pursuit mean projection for TCP trace [14] (traces consist of DDoS attacks).
Traces are analyzed with the use of 20 minutes windows
TCP trace
Window1 Window2 Window3
Mean
Mean
MP-MP MP-MP MP-MP
MP-MP
MP-MP
for trace
for normal
trace
Backscatter 2008.11.15 147,64 411,78 356,65 305,35 153,66
Backscatter 2008.08.20 208,40 161,28 153,47 174,38 153,66
traﬃc features. The eﬀectiveness of the proposed approach
has been proved in attack and anomaly detection scenarios.
Our framework can be applied to enhance military net-
works since it uses signal-based features. Such features can
be calculated for encrypted traﬃc since ﬂow characteristics
are extracted without considering the payload. Future work
focuses on algorithms optimization so that our framework
can be applied to real-time network security enhancement
and to protect federated network systems (e.g., in national
project SOPAS).
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